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PROGRESSIVE RACE BLINDNESS?:
INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY, GROUP POLITICS,
AND REFORM
Darren Lenard Hutchinson*
Critical Race Theorists advance race consciousness as a positive instrument
for political and legal reform. A growing body of works by left-identified scholars,
however, challenges this traditional progressive stance toward race consciousness.
After summarizing the contours of this budding literature, this Article criticizes the
"progressive race blindness" scholarship on several grounds and offers an alterna-
tive approach to race consciousness that balances skepticism towards the natural-
ness of race with a healthy appreciation of the realities of racial subjugation and
identity.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most contested doctrines in contemporary constitutional
law is the "colorblindness" principle. Drawing upon themes of fairness ar-
ticulated in modem racial justice movements, the U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently held that race is a presumptively impermissible basis for public
policy and legislative processes. Thus, racial classifications trigger strict
scrutiny-the Court's most exacting judicial review.2 The Court has also
held that it must have a consistent approach to racial classifications: Racial
classifications trigger strict scrutiny whether they are intended to harm per-
sons of color or to remedy the effects of racial discrimination. 3 This latter
doctrinal development-the application of strict scrutiny to remedial race-
conscious legislation and policies-has generated a tremendous amount of
scholarly debate.4
Critics of colorblindness have attacked the doctrine from a variety of
perspectives. Many liberal scholars and jurists have criticized the Court for
blurring the distinction between affirmative action and policies that subju-
gate persons of color. They contend that affirmative action is a benign form
of discrimination that pursues compelling policy ends and should, therefore,
receive a more deferential level of scrutiny from the Court.5 Recently, a
number of scholars have asserted that the Court's opposition to race con-
sciousness, particularly in the context of remedial usages of race, is inconsis-
tent with the original intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
1. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-27, 237-39 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642-44, 648-49 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493-98, 510-11 (1989).
2. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 652; Croson, 488 U.S. at 490.
3. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 202.
4. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 How. L.J. 1, 5-14
(1995) (discussing the academic and political debates over affirmative action).
5. See id. at 64-69.
6. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 429-32 (1997) (arguing
that originalism cannot justify the U.S. Supreme Court's opposition to affirmative action); Melissa
L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1997)
(arguing that the Framers of the Equal Protection Clause only intended to prohibit class distinc-
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These scholars have persuasively argued that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not seek to prohibit all forms of race consciousness and that
they even approved several legislative measures designed to assist blacks in
the postbellum era. Critical Race Theorists have portrayed the colorblind-
ness doctrine as a tool of oppression.' In several important works, Critical
Race Theorists have argued that race, though socially constructed, remains
salient in the lives of persons of color-as a source of both marginalization
and resistance. 8 The Court's colorblindness doctrine fails to appreciate the
positive usages of race by persons of color and the pervasiveness of racial
inequality and discrimination. 9 Critical Race Theorists have also demon-
strated that the Court's opposition to remedial race consciousness legitimizes
racial inequality, because colorblindness treats as acceptable the existing un-
equal distribution of social resources and weakens efforts to redistribute so-
cial resources in a more egalitarian fashion. 10 Critical Race Theorists have
argued further that the Court must view race consciousness in a more
nuanced and contextualized manner: The Court must seek to identify and to
root out invidious, rather than remedial, racial classifications."
Despite the general opposition to colorblindness among liberal scholars
and Critical Race Theorists, several left-identified commentators have re-
cently begun to challenge this conventional thinking concerning race.'
2
These progressive theorists contend that society should abandon the concept
of race and that people of color should lead this effort.13 These scholars
claim that the negative history of race renders it a peculiar location for peo-
ple of color to center their identities."4 Specifically, the authors maintain
that by clinging to race as an aspect of individual and group identity, people
of color allow a construct rooted in domination to define their existence and
fail to reconstruct their lives in a way that transcends the language of the
dominant culture.' 5
tions that lacked a "public purpose"); Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's Power to Enact
Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 477, 482 (1998) (arguing from an
originalist perspective that the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit the federal government from
enacting all forms of race-conscious legislation, including affirmative action).
7. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1,
53-55 (1991).
8. See generally Gary Pellet, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758 (discussing the role of
race consciousness in black antiracist activism).
9. See Spann, supra note 4, at 48-63 (arguing that the Court's affirmative action jurispru-
dence obscures the significance of race).
10. See id. at 13.
11. See Gotanda, supra note 7, at 46-53.
12. See, e.g., infra notes 17-18, 20, 24 and accompanying text (discussing progressive race
blindness scholarship).
13. See infra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
14. See id.
15. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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These scholars' stated political and intellectual commitments stand in
contrast to those of conservative scholars and jurists whose embrace of color-
blindness has greatly restricted legislative efforts to combat the effects of
racial subordination. Nevertheless, these left-identified scholars have faced
criticism that their arguments ignore race's positive value-its utility as a
tool for resisting racism. In response to such critiques, some of these scholars
have qualified their claims. They now argue that people of color should
discard race as an aspect of individual identity or group culture but should
continue to recognize and to respond to racial subordination in the larger
society.16
This Article responds to the advocates of "progressive race blindness"
with several critiques of their central claims. Part I examines the contours of
progressive race blindness in greater detail, giving centrality to the emer-
gence of this theory in legal scholarship. Part I sets forth the common
themes articulated in progressive race blindness arguments and highlights
important differences among its proponents. Part II isolates several problems
with the progressive race blindness literature and demonstrates that these
weaknesses make the literature unhelpful as a political or legal theory and
even dangerous to the cause of antiracism. Part III offers suggestions for
future theorizing in the context of progressive race blindness. Although the
proponents of progressive race blindness can overcome some of the limita-
tions of their work, this Article ultimately argues that people of color should
continue to "see" race as a dimension of both their individual and group
identities.
I. PROGRESSIVE RACE BLINDNESS: THE THEORY
A. General Themes
Although most critical scholars support race consciousness, a small
group of critical scholars have taken the position that society should aban-
don the concepts of race and racial identity. Scholars in the humanities,
such as Anthony Appiah and Paul Gilroy, have produced the bulk of this
scholarship. Recently, however, scholars such as Christi Cunningham,
Richard Ford, and Reginald Leamon Robinson have begun to embrace pro-
gressive race blindness in legal analysis. This part discusses the central
themes of progressive race blindness. Because the proponents of progressive
race blindness do not think identically, this part also discusses, when rele-
vant, certain important differences among the ideas of these scholars.
16. See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
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Progressive Race Blindness?
1. Race Is Socially Constructed
The proponents of progressive race blindness all start from the proposi-
tion that race does not exist in nature; instead, race is a product of human
effort and interaction. Reginald Leamon Robinson, for example, argues that
"race is not biologically factual. It is not real. As such, race does not have
any meaning that survives its social and historical context. Race exists, if
ever, in our individual and cultural consciousness."'" Similarly, Richard
Ford observes that "[it is now almost common knowledge that the idea of
race-as-biological-difference has been discredited as a matter of science."' 8
Advocates of progressive race blindness embrace the persuasive contempo-
rary social theories that dispel traditional accounts of race (and other iden-
tity categories) as products of biology. These categories are instead products
of social construction: Politics, history, economics, and social relations-
rather than biology-fabricate race.19
2. Race Can Be Abandoned
Because they subscribe to constructivist theories of race, advocates of
progressive race blindness contend that race does not have an inevitable
existence. On the contrary, race is a concept that society can discard.
Robinson challenges the normalization of racial identity. He contends that
race consciousness provides life support for the racial category. Robinson
argues that "[i]f we do not constantly and consciously meditate on it, race
cannot exist. Unfortunately, we fuel this social construct with our mental
17. Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Shifting Race-Consciousness Matrix and the Multiracial
Category Movement, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 232-33 (2000).
18. Richard T. Ford, Race As Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1806 (2000); see
also K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, in K. ANTHONY Ap.
PIAH & AMY GUTMAN, COLOR CONSCIOUSNESS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30-72
(1996) (arguing that "people are the product not of essences but of genes interacting with one
another and with environments, and there is little systematic correlation between the genes that
fix color and the like and the genes that shape courage or literary genius"); C. Christi Cunning-
ham, The "Racing" Cause of Action and the Identity Formally Known as Race: The Road to
Tamazunchale, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 709 (1999) (describing race as a "construct").
19. The constructivist theory of race is well-established. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1980s, at 60
(1986) ("Race is indeed a pre-eminently sociohistorical concept. Racial categories and the meaning
of race are given concrete expression by the specific social relations and historical context in which
they are embedded."); Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27 (1994) ("Race must be viewed
as a social construction. That is, human interaction rather than natural differentiation must be
seen as the source and continued basis for racial categorization."); Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigat-
ing the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747, 777 (1994) ("Race cannot be self-evident on the
basis of skin color, for skin color alone has no inherent meaning."); John A. Powell, The "Racing" of
American Society: Race Functioning as a Verb Before Signifying as a Noun, 15 LAW & INEQ. 99, 102
(1997) ("[R]ace is an experiential truth and it is a categorical error to attempt to reduce the mean-
ings and functions of race to scientifically verifiable measurements.").
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kindling and intellectual logs."2° Christi Cunningham urges persons of color
to "mourn" racial subjugation by setting aside race as a component of their
personal identities.2" She contends that persons of color can and should "let
die our malignant proxies for [community]," such as racial identity, and re-
create identity on nonartificial grounds.22 Richard Ford makes a similar
claim as Cunningham's-that race should be disaggregated from identity
and culture. He argues that
[olne can consistently support group consciousness for the sake of an-
tisubordination politics while remaining skeptical of the coherence of
group culture or culture-as-traditions and ambivalent or even hostile
to traditionalism and the idea that the norms and practices of any
group should be preserved from pressure to change. 23
Paul Gilroy exhibits a strong faith in the ability of society to transcend race.
His excitement stems from the scientific discrediting of the naturalness of
race. Gilroy argues that the term race linguistically implies a natural differ-
entiation among individuals that masks a deepening crisis in racial categori-
zation brought about by constructivist understandings of identity:
[Race] stands outside of, and in opposition to, most attempts to
render it secondary to the overwhelming sameness that
overdetermines social relationships between people and continually
betrays the tragic predicaments of their common species life. The
undervalued power of this crushingly obvious, almost banal human
sameness, so close and basically invariant that it regularly passes un-
remarked upon, also confirms that the crisis of raciological reasoning
presents an important opportunity where it points toward the possi-
bility of leaving "race" behind, of setting aside its disabling use as we
move out of the time in which it could have been expected to make
sense.
24
The import of social construction theories for the proponents of progressive
race blindness is clear: Because human interaction and agency, rather than
biology, create and re-create race, humans can dismantle and set aside their
usage of racial categorization.
20. Robinson, supra note 17, at 233; see also Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Underclass and
the Role of Race Consciousness: A New Age Critique of Black Wealth/White Wealth and American
Apartheid, 34 IND. L. REV. 1377, 1382 (2001) ("[Rlace does not use us. Rather, we experience race
if and only if we give our attention to race and its consciousness.").
21. See Cunningham, supra note 18, at 722-28.
22. Id. at 728.
23. Ford, supra note 18, at 1807.
24. PAUL GILROY, AGAINST RACE: IMAGINING POLITICAL CULTURE BEYOND THE COLOR
LINE 29 (2000) (emphasis added).
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3. Humans Should Discard Racial Identity
In addition to believing that we can discard the concept of race, pro-
gressive race blindness theorists believe that we should part company with
racial categorization. Advocates of progressive race blindness have assumed
a highly skeptical posture towards the utility of race in their scholarship.
These scholars have argued "against race" on several grounds.
a. Racial Classifications Have Produced a Legacy of Injuries and Wrongs
Advocates of progressive race blindness point to the injurious history of
racial classifications as a justification for radically deconstructing race con-
sciousness. Racial categories, they argue, have historically served as a site of
violent subjugation; because these categories are artificial, chosen, and op-
pressive, we should endeavor to destroy them. The progressive race blind-
ness theorists contend that by clinging to racial classification, we embrace
an identity rooted in subordination and domination. Cunningham, for ex-
ample, argues that "[tihe process of racing is a malignancy that infects our
identities, like those who raped our ancestors and thus became our ancestors
and ourselves. This trauma is evidenced by self-identification that rages
against racism yet clings to concepts of race that make it possible in defining
who we are."'25 Robinson takes an equally-if not more-morbid view of
racial identification. To Robinson, race consciousness buys into a flawed
structure in which "we internalize race's limitations-self hatred, alienation,
and segregation. '26 The implications of living within the "limitations" of
race are especially troubling for persons of color. According to Robinson,
race consciousness breeds a culture of inferiority, victimization, and helpless-
ness among persons of color. 27 If Robinson's claims are true, then progres-
sive movements like antiracism should not fight for the legal and political
recognition of such a psychologically destructive construct as race.
b. Racial Classifications Essentialize Groups
Proponents of progressive race blindness also argue against race con-
sciousness on the grounds that race essentializes groups of individuals by
25. Cunningham, supra note 18, at 724.
26. Robinson, supra note 17, at 241.
27. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, A Means of Preventing Escape from the Control of Her
White Masters, 15 TOURo L. REV., 401, 432-33 (1999) ("Taken together, illiteracy, Lynchian tac-
tics, and violence, a white master's plague of death and fear concretizes the belief that blacks must
live in a racialized box, and they must resist imagining a raceless life.") (citation omitted); Robin-
son, supra note 17, at 245 (arguing that race consciousness requires blacks to "think against a
backdrop of white supremacy in which they are inherently inferior"); Robinson, supra note 20, at
1433 ("By racializing our experiences, we rely on a race consciousness that renders us victims, and
in so doing we reject our spirituality."); id. at 1385-86 (lamenting the liberal rejection of "learned
helplessness" theories of racialized poverty).
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falsely implying that they experience life at a unitary location. Ford, for
example, eschews linking race and culture because he fears that this will
pose problems of cultural authenticity. Framing claims of cultural oppression
in racial terms risks litigating the messy question of what forms of cultural
expression are legitimate. 28 Cunningham considers race a "malignant proxy"
for community, 29 and Robinson contends that racial categorization oppresses
and limits the behaviors and choices of blacks by rigidly defining those ac-
tivities that are "authentically" black. 30
c. Race Consciousness Breeds Alienation
Some progressive race blindness theorists have also argued that race
consciousness breeds alienation-on both an individual and a community
level. Race consciousness alienates the individual from his or her "true" self,
a self unmarred by the myth of racial subjectivity. 3' Race consciousness also
separates all of us from one another by imposing artificial divisions among
the populace. 32
B. Important Distinctions Among Theorists of Progressive Race
Blindness
Although the advocates of progressive race blindness are united in their
suspicion of race consciousness and racial identity, there are some important
differences in their approaches that warrant discussion. My review of the
budding literature on progressive race blindness shows that the authors disa-
28. See Ford, supra note 18, at 1811. Ford argues that:
The rights argument that protects culture as the authentic expression of the individual
litigant must invite-in fact it must require-courts to determine which expressions are
authentic and therefore deserving of protection. The result will often be to discredit any-
one who does not fit the culture style ascribed to her racial group.
Id.
29. Cunningham, supra note 18, at 728.
30. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, "Expert Knowledge:" Introductory Comments on Race
Consciousness, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J., 145, 160-63 (2000).
31. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 18, at 722-29 (arguing that in order to live "whole"
lives persons of color need to "mourn" race and re-create their identities); Robinson, supra note 17
at 237 (arguing that by embracing race consciousness "we foolishly believe that 'blackness' or
'whiteness' represents our true, spiritual identity and our true beingness").
32. See Robinson, supra note 17, at 236-37. Robinson basically argues that racial groups
exist in a self-imposed "darkness" that inhibits mutual understanding:
Ultimately, then, it is as if we-blacks, whites, and others-walk into a well-lit room, turn
out the lights, forget about the light switch, and then curse the darkness. Because we
turned out the light, the idea of darkness must already have existed within our conscious-
ness. By dimming the light, we sought the dark. After we create darkness, then we alienate
ourselves from each other by becoming vested in our racialized roles, all the while blaming
the liberal state for solely creating race and for deliberately giving race its particularly venal
content.
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gree as to how much they wish to deconstruct the concept of race. The
authors also disagree as to whether race consciousness among persons of
color contributes to their inequality.
1. Does Race Exist?
Among the legal scholars, Robinson has been the most extreme and
steadfast in his deconstruction of, and animosity toward, race. At times,
Robinson assumes the mantra of a martyr in his deconstruction of race con-
sciousness: "I will continue my crusade, my mission, to destabilize race and
its consciousness so that we all-blacks, whites, and others-can be free to
know ourselves again. In so doing, I risk madness and beckon professional
isolation. '33 In addition, Robinson has produced the most sustained legal
scholarship opposing race consciousness from a "progressive" perspective,34
and his race-blind position has become more inflexible with each publica-
tion. Writers like Cunningham and Ford, in contrast, have exhibited a more
modest opposition to racial construction. Cunningham's single work on this
matter seems to distinguish the "personal" from the "political." Cunning-
ham argues that persons of color should abandon race as a concept that
defines "who they are" as a matter of self-identification but embrace the
concept of race as a political entity to respond to the reality of racial oppres-
sion.35 She explains that race has many descriptive purposes. Race can de-
scribe "a violence, a cause of action, that was and is done to people of color,"
and race can refer to elements of personal identity (or "who we are").36
Cunningham wishes to discard the latter usages of race-the identity quo-
tient-but maintain race as a concept for shaping political and equality
movements. 37 In fact, Cunningham believes that political and personal us-
ages of race are inevitably incompatible:
Concepts of identity will remain in conflict as long as constructions
that function to race us are internalized in our identity. As long as
race names who we are as well as our cause of action, we will be
trapped by identity and strategy contradictions. Separating what was
done to us from who we are means accepting the death of what has
been lost-that part of our identity, history, status, and culture that
was destroyed. 38
33. Robinson, supra note 30, at 149.
34. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 30; Robinson, supra note 27; Robinson, supra note 17;
Robinson, supra note 20.
35. See Cunningham, supra note 18, at 715-16 (stating that the purpose of her article is to
establish an argument for considering race as a "cause of action" while "re-considering race as a
foundation for identity").
36. Id. at 716.
37. See id. at 715-18.
38. Id. at 716.
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Cunningham argues that the historical wrongs associated with race along
with ongoing efforts to remedy those wrongs legally and politically render it
an inappropriate basis for self-identification and identity construction
among persons of color.39
Ford also believes that "seeing" race has some value to social justice
movements. Ford rejects the vulgar antiessentialism by commentators such
as Robinson and Appiah, who take the constructivist theory to an extreme
conclusion: Because race is socially constructed it is nonexistent.40  Ford
cautions against "rush[ing] to the conclusion that races do not exist."41 Ford
reasons:
The critique of the existence of biological racial groups was advanced
as support for an entirely distinct critique of the salience of racial
categories. This crude move needn't detain us long: It is obvious that
a refutation of the physical existence of a thing does not entail a
refutation of the sociological fact that there is widespread belief in it
and that social behavior is structured by that belief.42
Thus, Ford does not support the radical deconstruction of race advocated by
Robinson. Nevertheless, Ford believes that progressive scholars should limit
the scope of their race talk by disaggregating race from culture. He believes
that racializing culture risks essentializing racial groups.
2. Race Consciousness and Racial Inequality
Legal scholarship on progressive race blindness also differs in the degree
to which the authors attribute racial inequality to race consciousness.
Again, Robinson's views are the most extreme on this matter. Robinson
argues that race consciousness among persons of color-rather than institu-
tionalized and structural racism-sustains racial inequality. In a recent arti-
cle, for example, Robinson questions popular sociological literature that
links "concentrated poverty" with racial injustice. 43 Applying what he calls
"New Age Philosophy," Robinson attributes poverty in communities of color
39. See id.
40. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Vio-
lence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1296 n.180 (1991) (criticizing "vulgar con-
structionism" that leaves no "room for identity politics"); Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and
the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1774-75 (1990). Matsuda argues:
Professor Crenshaw avoids the simplistic anti-essentialism that deconstructs subordinated
group identity until subordination no longer seems to exist. There is a certain sophisticated
attraction to the critique that says something like, "All women could not possibly share the
same experience of subordination; therefore, gender-based cultural claims are vulgar and
diversionary." A similar critique of race as a category of analysis is also in vogue.
Id.
41. Ford, supra note 18, at 1806.
42. Id.
43. See Robinson, supra note 20, at 1400-11.
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to the "choices" and activities of poor individuals. He argues that poor per-
sons of color have the agency to choose poverty or wealth but instead "co-
create" poverty through their race consciousness:
Despite the manner in which race consciousness ... socializes us to
co-create poverty, wealth, or residential segregation, our essential Self
can still choose differently. We have absolute freedom. With this
absolute freedom, we can focus on a self-empowering philosophy like
New Age or a victim-centered race consciousness .... [Bly adopting
a self-empowering philosophy, one can deliberately choose to experi-
ence poverty or wealth. In so doing, she does not blame anyone else
for the manner in which she experienced her creations. 44
Thus, for Robinson, the effects of race consciousness are deleterious: Race
consciousness imprisons poor persons of color in poverty, and the genera-
tional transmission of the "disease" of race consciousness perpetuates racial-
ized class inequity. I have found no other writing in which an advocate of
progressive race blindness has attempted to link poverty with race conscious-
ness among poor persons of color: Robinson remains alone in this position
among the works that I have reviewed. In fact, Cunningham and Ford have
argued that racial justice claims should persist-even under their decon-
structed visions of identity politics. 45 These authors believe that the struc-
ture of white supremacy impacts the material reality of persons of color.
Hence, they favor the maintenance of race for the purpose of challenging
and responding to inequality.46
II. "FOR RACE": SOME TROUBLING OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING
PROGRESSIVE RACE BLINDNESS
Progressive race blindness scholarship challenges conventional think-
ing among critical scholars who have led the charge in responding to the
Court's colorblind jurisprudence. Advocates of progressive race blindness
seem passionate in their concern for the well-being of persons of color.
They also reject essentialist notions of race that hinder-rather than ad-
vance-social justice. The work of progressive race blindness theorists
should compel any scholar in the field of identity theory and antidiscrimina-
tion law to rethink or defend her or his position with respect to the inevita-
bility or desirability of racial categorization. Despite the intellectual energy
exhibited by these scholars and the provocative nature of their work, how-
ever, I remain unpersuaded by their general claim concerning the dangers of
44. Id. at 1432; see also Robinson, supra note 30, at 158-60 (arguing that persons of color
embrace race consciousness to their detriment).
45. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
46. Presumably, Cunningham and Ford do not in turn believe that the consciousness of race
required to make racial justice claims actually fosters racial injustice.
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race consciousness. This part offers several critical observations concerning
progressive race blindness scholarship.
A. Essentializing Race as Inherently Negative
The progressive race blindness scholarship suffers because it tends to
essentialize race as an inherently negative-or almost always negative-con-
struct. The fact that race is socially constructed does not mean that society
should have any interest in abandoning it as a concept of identity. In order
to justify the abolition of race, progressive race blindness scholars emphasize
the negative history of racial oppression. 47 Race and race consciousness,
however, need not foster subordination. If race is truly socially con-
structed-as the advocates of progressive race blindness forcefully argue-
then we can evaluate race consciousness in the context of its usage, rather
than believing the metanarrative that race is bad. 48 If social forces fabricate
racial understanding, then critical theorists can assess the value of race by
examining the social circumstances and purposes surrounding its deploy-
ment.49 Jayne Chong-Soon Lee has written cogently on the dangers of es-
sentialism in progressive race blindness arguments. Responding to the work
of Appiah, Lee offers a more contextualized assessment of race that chal-
lenges Appiah's grand narrative concerning the pitfalls and dangers of race
consciousness:
The most important weakness of Appiah's dismissal of race is that in
declaring biological and essential conceptions of race useless and dan-
gerous, he fails to recognize that race is defined not by its inherent
content, but by the social relations that construct it. If race is always
dangerous, regardless of its meaning within a specific historical and
social context, the result is an abstract and unitary conception of race.
Basically, Appiah's conception of race fails to acknowledge that
meanings change dramatically with social context. For Appiah, once
a conception of race is constructed, the possibility of contesting,
redefining, and reappropriating it is limited. 50
Progressive race blindness thus suffers from its inability to imagine positive
usages of race. The essentializing of race by advocates of progressive race
blindness contradicts their treatment of race as a social construct; it is, in
fact, the social-as opposed to biological-nature of race that gives race a
malleable quality.sl Thus, the social constructivist theory of race does not
47. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 19, at 772 (criticizing Anthony Appiah for essentializing race
as a negative concept).
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See id. ("Since the meaning of race depends on the specific social contexts in which it is
embedded, we will find as many definitions of race as there are social contexts."); see also Haney
49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1455 (2002)1466
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compel the radical deconstruction of race consciousness embraced by some
advocates of progressive race blindness. Instead, social construction theory
implies a host of possibilities for the positive deployment of race. Critical
scholars can assess the worth of race consciousness by examining the sur-
rounding facts associated with its usage.
B. Obscuring the Relationship Between Racial Identity and Racial
Resistance
Political resistance is perhaps the most positive usage of race by persons
of color. Persons of color utilize racial identity to respond to racial subjuga-
tion. Race serves as an organizational instrument for challenging racial op-
pression.52 Furthermore, in the context of law and policy, persons of color
and progressive scholars have advocated the implementation of race-con-
scious policies that seek to remedy social inequality1 3 Supreme Court oppo-
sition to remedial race consciousness has sparked a generous amount of
criticism from progressive scholars.54 The arguments of proponents of pro-
gressive race blindness threaten to legitimize this conservative jurisprudence
that neutralizes governmental efforts to combat racial injustice.55 The aboli-
tion of race-a position advanced in varying degrees in progressive race
blindness scholarship-would make it difficult for persons of color to resist
oppression and to demand race-conscious remedies for racial oppression.56
In an apparent effort to avoid complicating racial justice efforts, some
proponents of progressive race blindness have qualified their claims: They
L6pez, supra note 19, at 28 (arguing that "the meaning-systems surrounding race change quickly
rather than slowly").
52. See Crenshaw, supra note 40, at 1297 ("At this point in history, a strong case can be
made that the most critical resistance strategy for disempowered groups is to occupy and defend a
politics of social location rather than to vacate and destroy it."); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Be-
yond the Rhetoric of "Dirty Laundry": Examining the Value of Internal Criticism within Progressive Social
Movements and Oppressed Communities, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 185, 196 (1999) ("Members of op-
pressed communities often rally around their socially constructed identities in order to challenge
the oppression and discrimination mediated by these categories."); Chris K. lijima, Race as Resis-
tance: Racial Identity as More than Ancestral Heritage, 15 ToURo L. REv. 497, 509 (1999) ("At least
for Asian Pacific Americans, how we define ourselves is intimately tied to the political purpose of
our racial identity."); Chris K. lijima, The Era of We-Construction: Reclaiming the Politics of Asian
Pacific American Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the BlacklWhite Paradigm, 29 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 47, 55 (1997) [hereinafter lijima, The Era of We-Construction] ("In short, political
resistance to racial oppression is the content of racial identity, and progressive people of color must
reclaim the terms of the debate about what constitutes it."); Lee, supra note 19, at 772-73 (discuss-
ing the political usages of race).
53. See Spann, supra note 4, at 7-10.
54. See id.
55. See Lee, supra note 19, at 774-79 (demonstrating how essentialism in progressive race
blindness would legitimize conservative Supreme Court doctrine).
56. See id. at 772 ("To deny the term 'race' any content, as Appiah would have it, is to deny
a powerful metaphor to racial groups and to preclude valuable modes of resistance.").
have crafted their arguments to accommodate the usage of race as an an-
tisubordination tool. Cunningham, for example, wants to maintain "race as
a cause of action" for racial injustice, while extricating it from notions of
individual identity. 7 Even Appiah, who has been quite vigilant in his
deconstruction of and opposition to racial categorization, now recognizes (at
least in passing) the political significance of race to persons of color.58 Ap-
piah, nevertheless, qualifies his observation that race can serve as a site of
resistance by cautioning advocates of race consciousness against "let[ting]
our racial identities subject us to new tyrannies."5 9
This analytical compromise, which would keep race as a source of polit-
ical resistance while abandoning or tentatively embracing it as an aspect of
identity, obscures the connections between racial identity and resistance.
This blurring of identity and politics occurs because progressive race blind-
ness theorists overlook two important factors related to identity and resis-
tance. First, progressive race blindness theorists disregard the fact that racial
resistance strengthens an individual's racial identity or race consciousness.
Furthermore, these theorists do not recognize that some level of race con-
sciousness, or racial identity, serves as a prerequisite or catalyst for racial
resistance. In sum, the proponents of progressive race blindness do not ac-
knowledge that there is a symbiotic relationship between racial resistance
and identity formation; the two processes are mutually reinforcing.
Perhaps the clearest contemporary example of how resistance to oppres-
sion fashions identity occurred during the Black Power Movement of the
1960s. Antiracist activists used the language and structure of race to contest
oppressive racial practices and to re-cast black racial identity in a more posi-
tive light.60 Yet, the construction of identity through resistance is not
unique to race, and racial identity construction does not stand in isolation
from other forms of identity and domination.61 Thus, when Cunningham,
for example, makes the moderate claim that we should maintain race as a
cause of action but dismiss it as a component of individual identity, she must
57. Cunningham, supra note 18, at 715-16.
58. See APPIAH, supra note 18, at 104 ("Racial identity can be the basis of resistance to
racism .... ).
59. Id.; see also id. at 98-99 (arguing that the political usage of race can constrain individual
liberty).
60. See Crenshaw, supra note 40, at 1297 (discussing subversion of black identity by Black
nationalists); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Closet Case": Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the
Reinforcement of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Invisibility, 76 TUL. L. REv. 81, 111 (2001)
(same).
61. See SHANE PHELAN, GETTING SPECIFIC: POSTMODERN LESBIAN POLITICS 52 (1994) ("Be-
coming lesbian is indeed a process of resistance to patriarchal heterosexuality."); Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, "Claiming" and "Speaking" Who We Are: Black Gays and Lesbians, Racial Politics, and
the Million Man March, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER
28 (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999) (discussing the construction of black gay identity).
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explain how one can engage in resistance to racial subordination without
reinforcing her or his status as a racialized individual. Unfortunately, Cun-
ningham's work does not answer this important question.
The progressive race blindness scholarship also blurs the reality that
racial consciousness or identity serves as a prerequisite or catalyst for racial
resistance. Persons of color have written extensively on how their racial
identity-shaped by experiences with subordination-gives them valuable
"experiential knowledge" for challenging racial injustice. 6 Similarly, pro-
gressive whites have persuasively argued that white obliviousness to race and
racial identity impedes whites' understanding and appreciation of racial op-
pression. 63 For whites or persons of color, race consciousness and identity
help create the circumstances for meaningful racial resistance. Accordingly,
the progressive race blindness compromise, which seeks to maintain political
race but to extricate race from identity and culture, presents an unworkable
position. Political resistance to racial subordination constructs and rein-
forces racial identity and consciousness; racial identity and consciousness are
prerequisites for racial resistance. By opposing or questioning racial identity,
proponents of progressive race blindness offer a theory that renders racial
resistance an extraordinarily difficult or even impossible proposition.
C. Ignoring the Multidimensionality of Identity and Subordination
One of the more striking aspects of progressive race blindness is its uni-
tary focus on race as an identity for disposal. Although many forms of iden-
tity are socially constructed and are grounded in histories of oppression and
marginalization, the advocates of progressive race blindness single out race
for deconstruction. Their arguments imply that race, in particular, warrants
discarding. They do not even consider what we should do with other forms
of identity, and they do not suggest a comprehensive abolition of identity
62. Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in
Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864, 1864-65 (1990) ("Critical Race Theorists are
attempting to integrate their experiential knowledge, drawn from a shared history as 'other,' with
their ongoing struggles to transform a world deteriorating under the albatross of racial hegemony.");
see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2034 ("[Like Critical
Feminist Theory, Critical Race Theory is largely experiential, grounded in the experience of schol-
ars of color as participants in a society whose history has been soiled by racism and racist acts
toward people of color.").
63. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993) ("Transparency often is the
mechanism through which white decisionmakers who disavow white supremacy impose white
norms on blacks. Transparency operates to require black assimilation even when pluralism is the
articulated goal; it affords substantial advantages to whites over blacks even when decisionmakers
intend to effect substantive racial justice."); id. at 973-74 ("Given whites' tendency not to be
aware of whiteness, it's unlikely that white decisionmakers do not similarly misidentify as race-
neutral personal characteristics, traits, and behaviors that are in fact closely associated with white-
ness. The ways in which transparency might infect white decisionmaking are many and varied.").
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categories. Furthermore, many of the arguments of progressive race blind-
ness theorists are directed toward persons of color, as if persons of color are
the only individuals invested in race consciousness or that race conscious-
ness among persons of color is especially problematic.
The most troubling aspect of race centrality in progressive race blind-
ness theories is that it implies a separability of identity categories and sys-
tems of oppression. When progressive race blindness theorists advocate the
termination of racial identity without commenting on the persistence of
gender, sexuality, class, and other identities, they suggest that their racial
deconstruction does not implicate other forms of social identity. Yet, as a
rich body of scholarship has demonstrated, identity categories do not exist in
isolation from one another.64 Instead, identity is multidimensional: The va-
rious identity categories interact to shape our individual and collective iden-
tities and experiences. 65  The progressive race blindness critique falsely
implies a separability of identity categories, because this scholarship advo-
cates the abolition of race but not other identity categories. The progressive
race blindness critique fragments identity.
Critical scholars have cautioned against efforts to analyze identity cate-
gories as unrelated and separate phenomena. For example, Audre Lorde, a
black lesbian theorist, has criticized the fragmentation of identity in social
justice movements:
As a Black lesbian feminist comfortable with the many different in-
gredients of my identity, and a woman committed to racial and sexual
freedom from oppression, I find I am constantly being encouraged to
pluck out some one aspect of myself and present this as the meaning-
64. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 375 (discussing the "interlocking system of oppression based on race
and gender that operates to the detriment of all women and all blacks"); Crenshaw, supra note 7, at
1242-43 (noting that "[fleminist efforts to politicize experiences of women and antiracist efforts to
politicize experiences of people of color have frequently proceeded as though the issues and exper-
iences they each detail occur on mutually exclusive terrains" and arguing that they do not); Nancy
Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1037,
1090 (1996) ("It is crucial to recognize that various forms of oppression ... are intertwined. Op-
pressions of gender intersect with other oppressions, including those of race, sexuality, class and
ethnicity."); Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991) ("As we look at ... patterns of oppression, we may come to
learn, finally and most importantly, that all forms of subordination are interlocking and mutually
reinforcing."); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation
of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1,
374 (1995) (observing that "oppressions of various sorts always interlock because popular prejudice
travels in multiples").
65. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality," "Multidimen-
sionality," and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285
(2001) (discussing the complexity of subordination).
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ful whole, eclipsing or denying the other parts of self. But this is a
destructive and fragmenting way to live.66
The progressive race blindness critique implicates Lorde's complaint. Propo-
nents of progressive race blindness imply a severability of identity in their
arguments which seek the abolition of racial but not other forms of identity.
Their arguments fragment identity and betray efforts to foster a more mul-
tidimensional understanding of identity and subordination.
D. Failure to Provide a Practical Agenda
Another weakness in progressive race blindness scholarship is that it
fails to explain how to end race consciousness. Ending "race as we know it"
is a tall order in a society that has been rigidly defined and marked by race.
67
Despite the implementation of legal provisions guaranteeing formal equality,
racial inequality, white supremacy, institutional racism, and the subjugation
of persons of color are enduring features of American economic, legal, politi-
cal, and social life. 68 Furthermore, the protracted efforts of progressive ele-
ments to rid society of inequality have lessened, but not eradicated, the
problem. 69 Undoubtedly, the persistence and ubiquity of racism has led the
progressive race blindness scholars to advance the abolition of race. 70 But
the proven durability of racism counsels against the advancement of a race-
blind agenda without any programmatic detail. This is not to say that every
piece of scholarship that offers a new vision should provide a literal road
66. AUDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER OUT-
SIDER: ARTICLES AND SPEECHES 120 (1984).
67. See Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Racial
Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. L. REV. 11, 18-19 (2001). Cottrol makes the follow-
ing observation:
In this world, the United States of the first half-indeed more than the first half-of the
twentieth century, the role of law in maintaining the nation's systemic racial hierarchy was
unambiguous. The law sanctioned a clear system of white supremacy and black subordina-
tion, notwithstanding the imperatives of the Civil War Amendments.
id.
68. See, e.g., id. at 21 ("The development and enforcement of egalitarian legal norms over
the last generation and a half has helped to lessen, but has by no means erased, often profound
differences between the experiences and circumstances of blacks and whites in the United
States."); Kimberl Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1378-79 (1988) ("Racial hierarchy cannot be cured by the move to facial race-neutral-
ity . . . White race consciousness, in a new form but still virulent, plays an important, perhaps
crucial, role in the new regime that has legitimated the deteriorating day-to-day material condi-
tions of the majority of Blacks."); Charles R. Lawrence 111, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1987) ("But racism in America is
much more complex than either the conscious conspiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of
a few ignorant bigots. It is a part of our common historical experience and, therefore, a part of our
culture.").
69. See generally sources cited supra note 68.
70. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
map for implementing its concerns. The centrality of race in American life,
however, means that the radical deconstruction that the progressive race
blindness theorists advocate will require innovative, if not invasive, efforts.
Nevertheless, there is very little in progressive race blindness scholarship
that explains how we might accomplish their provocative ideas. Perhaps
such detail is lacking because the task they have assumed is an impossible
one.
E. Ignoring the Magnitude and Varieties of Racism
A final problem with progressive race blindness theory is that some of
the authors fail to appreciate the magnitude and complexity of racial hierar-
chy. The work of Ford and Robinson illustrate this point. Ford argues that
racial justice claims should be divorced from claims of cultural oppression.7'
Ford's primary ground for skepticism is his belief that the blending of race
and culture will harm persons of color by essentializing cultural identity and
group membership and that the litigation of "race-as-culture" discrimination
claims will empower courts to define "authentic" and "inauthentic" cultural
participation. 7 Ford's analysis fails to comprehend the variety of forms in
which racism exists. In particular, Ford does not appreciate the cultural
forms of racism and their detrimental effects upon persons of color. In the
context of employment discrimination, for example, employers have dis-
criminated on the basis of a battery of workplace rules, such as language
("English-only"), dress, and grooming codes, that operate negatively upon
persons of color; these regulations penalize employees for wearing clothing,
speaking languages, or wearing hairstyles that are racially identifiable. 73 As
several scholars have recognized, the failure of courts to protect race-as-cul-
ture results from a narrow view that race has a fixed, static, and even biologi-
cal quality; race, however, is active, practiced, and expressive.74 The courts'
71. See Ford, supra note 18, at 1807.
72. Id. at 1811. Ford also claims that the recognition of cultural claims will place antidis-
crimination law on a dangerous slippery slope where spurious claims of behavioral discrimination
will weaken the civil rights imperative, thus harming antiracism. See id. at 1804 (warning of the
dangers of "bicyclists" and obesity civil rights litigation).
73. See Leti Volpp, Righting Wrongs, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1821-22 (2000) (criticizing
Ford for not recognizing the existence of cultural racism).
74. On the active nature of identity, see Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the
Definition of Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 769, 839 (1987) (arguing that
"[i]ndividuals ... conceive their special identities through a wide amalgam of acts" and, conse-
quently, "we must criticize the cavalier fashion with which courts dismiss individuals' claims that
employers' racially, sexually, or ethnically premised rules unjustly restrict personal integrity and
expression"); Caldwell, supra note 64, at 366-67, 371-81, 385-88 (criticizing courts for not treat-
ing employers' regulation of black women's physical appearance in the workplace as a form of
racial, gender, and cultural domination); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins
Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as
the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347,
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separation of race and culture allows employers and other discriminators to
force "Others" to assimilate white, heterosexual, and male norms, while pur-
porting to regulate "neutral" behaviors such as dress, language, and hair-
style. 75 Ford's desire to place a wall of separation between race and culture,
coupled with his general suspicion of behavioral civil rights claims, legiti-
mizes this narrow, status-enforcing jurisprudence.
In addition to legitimizing racially hierarchical jurisprudence, at least
one advocate of progressive race blindness-Reginald Leamon Robinson-
has essentially argued that persons of color create their own inequality by
subscribing to race consciousness. Robinson adheres to what he calls New
Age Philosophy, and he posits that a tenet of this philosophy is the notion
that individuals possess unfettered "free will" or agency.76 Thus, structural
racism does not create material inequality among persons of color. Rather,
persons of color remain poor because of their own choices, race conscious-
ness being the most problematic of these choices. Robinson argues that by
embracing race consciousness, persons of color accept white supremacist no-
tions concerning the inferiority of persons of color and, thereby, impose arti-
ficial limitations upon their own life opportunities. Robinson's arguments
sound strikingly familiar: They parallel a rhetoric of cultural inferiority ad-
vanced by conservative theorists who have attempted to blame persons of
color, particularly poor women of color, for the economic deprivation exper-
ienced by communities of color. A large body of academic literature has
refuted the contentions of these conservative scholars and has unmasked the
racial and gendered assumptions of their work. 77 Robinson, however, rejects
1367-72 (1997) (arguing that courts fail to treat employers' Spanish-language discrimination as a
manifestation of national-origin discrimination because they do not appreciate the centrality of
Spanish language in constructing Latino/a identity); Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness
and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 2008 (2000) (arguing that the
doctrinal treatment of "race as an immutable trait means that merely 'cultural' behaviors and prac-
tices do not receive legal protection unless they can be strongly linked back to the 'immutable'
characteristics of race or national origin" and that "[tihe separation of 'race' from 'culture' ... gives
employers and government agencies broad room to force employees marked as racially 'other' to
assimilate to a socially 'white' standard"); Hutchinson, supra note 60, at 111 (arguing that identity
categories have "expressive dimensions").
75. See Harris, supra note 74, at 2008.
76. Robinson, supra note 20, at 1422-23.
77. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE
WAR ON WELFARE 16-43 (1989) (criticizing culture-of-poverty theories); WILLIAM RYAN, BLAM-
ING THE VIcTIM 119-20 (2d ed. 1976) (same); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVAN-
TAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (attributing racialized
poverty to economic dislocation); Stanley F. Battle, Homeless Women and Children: The Question of
Poverty, 14 CHILD & YOUTH SERV. 111, 114-20 (1990) (criticizing culture-of-poverty theories);
Donald P. Judges, Bayonets for the Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and Disadvantaged Neighbor-
hoods, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 683-89 (1992) (discussing literature refuting culture-of-
poverty theories); Hyman Rodman, Culture of Poverty: The Rise and Fall of a Concept, 25 Soc. REV.
867 (1977) (criticizing culture-of-poverty theories); Marta Tienda & Haya Stier, Joblessness and
the qualitative and quantitative findings of this scholarship, asserting that
the scholarship evades the question of individual responsibility.78 Robin-
son's arguments attempt to repackage the conservative culture-of-poverty
theory as a progressive postmodernist critique.
Although Robinson's work is undeniably provocative, it fails in many
respects. First, Robinson's analysis does not effectively respond to the large
body of literature that has refuted many of the claims made by culture-of-
poverty theorists. 79 Instead, Robinson simply faults this literature for not
taking personal behavior-rather than white supremacy-into account. De-
spite the empirical research that demonstrates how structural racial inequal-
ity constructs poverty, Robinson, wedded to the notions of free will and
agency, concludes that the unwise choices of persons of color play the cen-
tral role in their poverty. Because poor persons of color, according to Robin-
son, are in fact free agents, they must have chosen poverty; wealth was a
viable, but unelected, option for them. According to Robinson, poor per-
sons of color are not victims of structural and material inequality. Instead,
they are trapped by their own racialized thinking: They accept a script of
black inferiority and live their lives accordingly.
I do not wish to document the impact of structural racism and eco-
nomic dislocation on the material conditions for poor persons of color; a
host of literature has already demonstrated the operation of racism and eco-
nomic dislocation on the maintenance and structuring of poverty. 0 Instead,
I wish to unveil the most serious and dangerous failing of Robinson's work:
his unfounded dismissal of the existence of structural racism. In his zeal to
portray race as a social construct, Robinson denies the existence of racism.
As such, racism, like race itself, assumes a fictional quality.81 Robinson's
argument takes social construction theory to an illogical and unrealistic
place. The fact that race is socially constructed does not negate its tangible
Shiftlessness: Labor Force Activity in Chicago's Inner City, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, 135, 151-52
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (criticizing culture-of-poverty theories and
attributing racialized poverty to economic dislocation); Maxine Baca Zinn, Family, Race, and Pov-
erty in the Eighties, 14 SIGNS 856 (1989) (same). See generally CHARLES A. VALENTINE, CULTURE
AND POVERTY: CRITIQUE AND COUNTER-PROPOSALS (1968).
78. See generally Robinson, supra note 20 (criticizing sociological literature that links racism
and poverty).
79. See sources cited supra note 77.
80. See id.
81. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). In Plessy, the Court rejected the
argument that racial apartheid enforced white supremacy, describing this contention as fictional
and imagined:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferi-
ority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
Id. at 551.
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and lived quality.82 Historical, political, legal, and economic forces involved
in the production of race (for example, slavery, segregation, oppressive vio-
lence, and employment and educational discrimination) have skewed (and
continue to skew) the distribution of life-sustaining resources in favor of
whites. 83 The social quality of race does not alter this white supremacist
resource allocation. Nor does it mean that a mere transformation in the
consciousness among persons of color can eradicate racism's harmful and
pervasive effects. In fact, the race blindness that Robinson advocates would
preclude persons of color from effectively describing and countering their
oppression. Robinson does very little to prove his thesis that rampant inter-
nalized racism in communities of color explains racialized economic inequal-
ity.84 Instead, Robinson's "psychoanalytic" arguments concerning poor
persons of color leave the impression that he holds stereotypical and essen-
tialist views of the very group he purports to defend.
III. BEYOND RACE TRASHING: EMBRACING THE
MANY FACES OF RACE
The budding progressive race blindness movement offers a provocative
analysis of contemporary race relations. The authors in this movement cor-
rectly view race as a social construct. Thus, they are aligned with Critical
Race Theorists and other progressive scholars who, moved by poststructural-
ism and postmodernism, have rejected biological notions of race. The point
82. See lijima, The Era of We-Construction, supra note 52, at 53 ("Although race is socially
constructed and not an immutable biological characteristic, the effect of the phenomenon of race is
nonetheless real."); Charles R. Lawrence III, Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Trans-
formation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 835 n.71 (1995) ("To recognize that race is socially constructed
does not make it any less real."); John A. Powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Catego-
ries Reconsidered, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 789, 791 (1997) ("While the claim that race is an illusion draws
on the work of late- and post-modernists-particularly the work of Omi and Winant, which pur-
ports that race is socially constructed-the conclusion that race is not real does not comport with
the deeper implication of this insight.").
83. See Flagg, supra note 63, at 954-55 (discussing racial inequality and concluding that
colorblindness cannot achieve racial justice). See generally Samuel L. Myers, Jr., "The Rich Get
Richer and . . . " The Problem of Race and Inequality in the 1990s, 11 LAW & INEQ. 369 (1993)
(discussing racial inequality in a host of areas). As T. Alexander Aleinikoff argues:
It is difficult to peruse an American newspaper today without confronting the continuing
significance of race in the nation. Whether it is statistics that demonstrate unrelenting
racial inequality in most of the important signifiers of social and economic well-being, de-
bates over civil rights legislation, Supreme Court nominations, the arts, athletes and man-
agers, police misconduct, political campaigns, or even military affairs and foreign policy, we
are constantly made aware that we are far from a color-blind society.
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 325, 330 (1992).
84. Robinson cites to anecdotal evidence and popular culture to prove this theory. See
Robinson, supra note 20, at 1440. This "evidence" cannot support as devastating a conclusion as
the assertion that racism does not exist and that poor persons of color acquiesce to racism.
of departure between the race blindness movement and Critical Race The-
ory, however, is that the former seems influenced by an extreme version of
postmodernism. The progressive race blindness movement's zeal for decon-
struction has blinded its participants to the material and tangible manifesta-
tions of race, to the political value of race as a means for resisting
subordination, to the ways in which racial resistance shapes and constructs
identity and culture, and to the relationships among race and other socially
constructed identities. Efforts to denaturalize race, however, do not require
us to ignore the utility or concrete social impact of race. Instead, it is possi-
ble to maintain a nuanced approach to race that blends postmodernist and
modernist thinking. Critical Race Theory embodies this complexity. In
particular, critical race contestations with Critical Legal Studies scholars
over the efficacy of a regime of legal rights provide a workable model for
blending postmodern skepticism of race with the reality that race, though
constructed, has concrete and helpful dimensions.
A. Critical Race Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and "Rights Trashing"
The Critical Legal Studies movement emerged in order to examine the
ways in which the law reinforces hierarchical social relations. Critical Legal
Scholars draw from several political and intellectual movements, including
Marxism, Legal Realism, poststructuralism, and postmodemism. Critical Le-
gal Scholars contend that legal doctrine is indeterminate, contradictory, and
partial to privileged classes. Far from being a site of abstract and neutral
reasoning, law, Critical Legal Scholars contend, is ideological and political.
Critical Legal Scholars also argue that the law invokes imposing images and
technical language in order to mystify its audiences and to convince them
that legal arrangements are natural and inevitable. Critical Legal Scholars
often target legal rights in their critiques. Critical Legal Scholars believe
that rights are malleable and that they alienate individuals from one another
and induce a false consciousness among oppressed people who, believing
they are truly protected by rights, do not actively resist their oppression.
Several, though not all, Critical Legal Scholars trash rights and argue that
progressives should stress informality over the structure of rights; rights sim-
ply reify law and nurture the illusion of law's naturalness. Postmodemism
leads Critical Legal Scholars to question reliance upon law as a vehicle for
achieving justice. Critical Legal Scholars conclude that rights are part of an
oppressive social regime and that progressive scholars should forcefully
deconstruct their seemingly natural status. 85
85. For a sampling of works on Critical Legal Studies, see CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (James
Boyle ed. 1992); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Alan Hutchinson ed. 1988); MARK A. KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); and ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT (1990).
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Critical Race Theorists share Critical Legal Scholars' skepticism toward
law's purported neutrality. They accept Critical Legal Scholars' indetermi-
nacy thesis, believe that the law reinforces hierarchical social relations, and
concur with the notion that the law is a limited, perhaps even improper,
instrument for pursuing equality. Yet, Critical Race Theorists do not share
the Critical Legal Scholars' desire to move beyond a rights structure. Al-
though they concede that rights are malleable and socially constructed, they
are also aware of the importance of rights in the struggle for racial justice.
Several Critical Race Theorists contributed to a symposium in the Harvard
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 6 in which they criticized Critical Legal
Scholars for failing to recognize the importance of rights for communities of
color. Although they acknowledge the limitations of rights talk, Critical
Race Theorists also believe that rights play a vital role in antiracism. Patri-
cia Williams, for example, eloquently conveys the simultaneous mistrust of
and reliance upon rights by blacks:
To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true; yet it is also
true that blacks believed in them so much and so hard that we gave
them life where there was none before. We held onto them, put the
hope of them into our wombs, and mothered them-not just the no-
tion of them. We nurtured rights and gave rights life. And this was
not the dry process of reification, from which life is drained and real-
ity fades as the cement of conceptual determinism hardens round-
but its opposite. This was the resurrection of life from 400-year-old
ashes; the parthenogenesis of unfertilized hope.87
Critical Race Theorists, therefore, embrace both a postmodernist skepticism
toward the efficacy, neutrality, and inevitability of law and a concomitant
modernist reliance upon law and enlightened reasoning as sources of an-
tiracist resistance. 88
In a thoughtful account of the divide between Critical Race Theory
and Critical Legal Studies, Angela Harris argues that the task for Critical
Race Theorists is to "live in the conflict between modernism and
postmodernism."' 9 Harris offers a healthy resolution to the apparent inter-
nal contradiction of Critical Race Theory. Critical Race Theorists cannot
completely reject postmodernism, because "the old optimistic faith in rea-
son, truth, blind justice, and neutrality, have not brought us to racial justice,
86. Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 297 (1987).
87. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 430 (1987).
88. See Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 748-54(1994) (discussing the postmodernist and modernist strands of Critical Race Theory).
89. Id. at 762.
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but have rather left us 'stirring the ashes."' 90 Nevertheless, a wholesale com-
mitment to postmodernism (and complete rejection of modernist principles)
is undesirable because "faith in reason and truth and belief in the essential
freedom of rational subjects have enabled people of color to survive and
resist subordination."91 Both postmodernism and modernism offer strategic
advantages for antiracist theory. Rather than seeking to resolve its internal
conflict, Critical Race Theory should seek to "inhabit that very tension."92
B. Dual Consciousness and Progressive Race Blindness: Beyond Race
Trashing
The dual consciousness of Critical Race Theory can help move progres-
sive race blindness beyond its substantive limitations. Critical Race Theo-
rists recognize that race is socially constructed, 93 that racial mythology has
caused a great deal of suffering in communities of color,94 and that racial
categorization risks essentialism. 95 Critical Race Theory, however, blends
this postmodern skepticism of race with an appreciation of the material real-
90. Id. at 759.
91. Id. at 753.
92. Id. at 760. Other scholars have observed this dual consciousness of Critical Race Theory
that combines skepticism toward the law with a commitment to reasoning and rights. See, e.g.,
Barnes, supra note 62, at 1865-66 (arguing that "dual consciousness" is a "central element" of
Critical Race Theory); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 341 (1987) ("The minority experience of dual consciousness
accommodates both the idea of legal indeterminacy as well as the core belief in a liberating law
that transcends indeterminacy.").
93. See Derrick A. Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 906
(observing that "Critical Race Theory writing embraces an experientially grounded, oppositionally
expressed, and transformatively aspirational concern with race and other socially constructed hier-
archies"); Anthony E. Cook, The Spiritual Movement Towards Justice, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1007,
1008 (arguing that Critical Race Theory seeks "to elucidate the ways in which those in power have
socially constructed the very concept of race over time"); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone:
Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1638-39 (1999) ("Race is only skin deep because
it is always a social construction (but a very important social construction) and the work of Critical
Race Theory is to go beyond the socially constructed boundaries and is exactly about understand-
ing race's importance but scientific insignificance."); Haney L6pez, supra note 19, at 6 (advancing
"a new theory of race as a social complex of meanings"); Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of
Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 57, 70 (1995) (observing that "Critical Race Theorists reject the conception of the self as
innate, immutable, and autonomous, and insist instead on the recognition of 'race' as-like all
attributes of personhood-a political construction"); Powell, supra note 19, at 100 ("[R]ace is not a
single, unitary concept, but rather one that mutates and adapts across sociohistorical contents.").
94. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 93, at 1008 (arguing that the social construction of race "has
transformed certain differences in color, culture, behavior and outlook into hierarchies of privilege
and subordination").
95. One of the most important theoretical developments in Critical Race Theory is scholar-
ship that seeks to expand and to make more comprehensive racial categories. See generally Hutch-
inson, supra note 65, at 285 (discussing antiessentialist dimensions of critical race and
antiheterosexist legal theories).
ity of race and its role in antiracist reform. Race has a tangible and real
quality in that it distributes social resources, constitutes identity, organizes
communities of color politically, and can serve as a structure for remedying
inequality.96 This modernist vision, which treats race as an inevitable struc-
ture, co-exists with critical race deconstruction of racial categorization.
The duality of Critical Race Theory can help redirect the content of
progressive race blindness theory in order to move that work beyond its the-
oretical limitations. Progressive race blindness theorists, in varying degrees,
disregard the material impact of race, the reality of structural racism, the
positive usages of race as a tool of resistance, and the multidimensionality of
identity97 Given the socially constructed but material nature of race, propo-
nents of progressive race blindness should reexamine their staunch commit-
ment to extreme postmodern accounts of identity. If they balance their
skepticism of race with an understanding of the social significance of racial
identity and race consciousness, progressive race blindness theorists can offer
an analysis of race that does not dismiss the importance of race to antiracism
and to the psyche of persons of color. Only a nuanced theory of race that
acknowledges both its constructed and material dimensions can lead to a
realistic account of racial injustice and, potentially, to the articulation of
workable antisubordination theories.
CONCLUSION
This symposium has provided the space for considering new and pro-
vocative theories of race. The progressive race blindness movement offers a
fresh approach to race that seeks to shatter biological and essentialist think-
ing among progressive theorists and persons of color. While progressive
movements should welcome and accommodate dissenting voices, the work
of progressive race blindness scholars ultimately undermines the goals of
these movements. Progressive race blindness fails to recognize the positive
and contextual meanings of race and the relationship of race to other iden-
tity categories and forms of subjugation. While the postmodem analysis of
identity as a social-rather than biological-phenomenon has added valua-
ble contributions to contemporary equality theories, critical theorists must
not forget the material dimensions of identity. Although identity categories
are socially produced, they have substantive dimensions: Identity categories
correlate with the unequal distribution of vital social resources and serve as
ongoing sources of discrimination in a variety of social contexts.
The dual consciousness of Critical Race Theory can help bridge the
competing realities of race as fictional but real. Critical Race Theory blends
96. See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
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skepticism toward legal abstraction with a passionate commitment to utiliz-
ing legal structures to revitalize conditions in oppressed communities. Ad-
vocates of progressive race blindness can learn from the work of Critical
Race Scholars who challenged the radical deconstruction of the Critical Le-
gal Studies movement. Skepticism toward race need not lead to a wholesale
rejection of its utility for social justice movements. Instead, a sophisticated
approach to race that blends modernist and postmodern narratives can offer
a richer account of racial justice that preserves available (and limited) in-
struments for resisting domination. The political importance of race to all
oppressed communities and progressive movements counsels against the ef-
forts of the progressive race blindness movement to move beyond race. Ulti-
mately, critical scholars must continue to articulate theories that reconstruct
and unveil, rather than submerge and obscure, the meanings of race.
